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Shares, shareholders, and the monitoring of 
management have a long history in the Nether-
lands. By issuing the world’s first tradable shares 
in 1602, the Dutch Verenigde Oostindische Com-
pagnie introduced a new system to finance large 
companies. This innovative system had some 
clear benefits from the start, but also suffered a 
variety of problems between the parties involved. 
The pressure to solve these issues eventually re-
sulted in the establishment of supervisory boards 
to represent shareholders and other stakeholders 
to look after the interests of the company
For a long time, these supervisory boards were 
quite large and recruited members from a lim-
ited pool of people. Through the so-called ‘old 
boys network’, candidates for supervisory board 
positions were often known to each other and 
approached informally. Over time, the system 
gradually changed. Since the 1980s, the finan-
cial system has grown rapidly and the position 
of the shareholder has strengthened. During 
the following two decades, the globalisation 
of the economy, in particular financial markets, 
proceeded at a rapid pace. 
The increase in international shareholders, the 
arrival of large institutional investors, and the 
growing activities of private equity, altered the 
environment for companies and their superviso-
ry boards. At the same time, corporate scandals 
and subsequent public scrutiny created pres-
sure for more regulation. The Sarbanes- Oxley 
Act (2002) created a new and more demanding 
regulatory framework for companies active in 
the US. In the Netherlands, the accounting 
scandal at Ahold led indirectly to the acceptance 
of the Tabaksblat Code (corporate governance 
code), and growing pressure on, and higher 
expectations of, supervisory boards. The 2008 
financial crisis resulted in increased regulation, 
affecting the environment in which companies, 
especially in the financial sector, operated.
This is the backdrop for our study on the chang-
ing profile and characteristics of the supervisory 
board chairmen in listed Dutch companies 
since 1990. The chairman’s role has changed 
from being primus inter pares to an important 
and central position in the Dutch corporate 
governance system, which has benefited from 
growing professionalisation.
In the first half of our report we analyse trends 
in chairman profiles as they relate to age, 
recruitment and retirement, tenure, executive 
background, nationality, educational back-
ground, and gender. 
In the second half of our report we consider 
how the role of the chairmen will continue to 
develop over the coming years. As the role 
evolves so will the selection criteria, which in 
turn will improve the suitability of potential 
candidates, improving the quality of the entire 
corporate governance system.
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Spencer Stuart Amsterdam
Kees van Veen 
Institute for Governance and Organizational 
Responsibility, University of Groningen  
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The changing profile of chairmen in  
Dutch listed companies 1990–2018
IntroductIon
Just as the chairman’s role has evolved since 
1990, so too has the profile of those occupying 
the position. Our population consists of 245 
chairperson positions of supervisory boards, 
occupied by 184 individuals (chairmen are 
not restricted to one position; they may hold, 
or have held, more than one). We focused on 
the following trends: age (average age, age 
at appointment and age at the end of tenure), 
tenure, former position, nationality, educational 
background, and gender. 
Methodology
Selection of companies 
Our starting point was the 49 AEX and AMX 
companies on the Euronext Amsterdam, as at 
March 2018. Nine companies were eliminated 
from the AEX- AMX list because of the marginal 
nature of their operations in the Netherlands, 
or are too recently listed. The nine were:  
Altice, AMG Group, Aperam, ArcelorMittal,  
Gemalto, OCI, Takeaway.com, Unibail- 
Rodamco, and WDP. 
To maintain our sample at 50 companies, we 
added a further 10 listed companies, based 
on revenue and number of employees: Accell 
Group, Brunel, HAL, Heijmans, Hunter Doug-
las Group, Kendrion, Oranjewoud, Refresco 
Group, VolkerWessels, and Wessanen. 
Chairmen 
Data relates to the chairmen of the companies 
in the period under review, and includes prede-
cessors of organisations that these companies 
acquired or merged with.
Data before 1990 
Time- related data, such as the starting or retire-
ment dates, was collected for the period prior 
to 1990. To calculate duration data, such as 
tenure, the complete data range has been used, 
including for chairmen still in position. The 
data is thus “left censored”.
Data sources
All data was collected by Spencer Stuart from 
public sources. 
Positions versus individuals 
Analysis focuses on the characteristics of the 
individuals (184) occupying chairmanships 
(245). Depending on the characteristics under 
review, we have selected the most appropriate 






The average age of chairmen in 1990 was 61.5 
years. By 2018 it had risen to of 66.5 years.
Several factors explain the trend. First, chair-
men are staying longer in post. Second, the 
age at which chairmen are recruited has risen: 
in 1990, chairmen in our survey started their 
tenure at 57, on average, but by 2018 this had 
increased by four years to about 61.5 years. 
Third, it is possible that the rising overall age 
reflects an increase in the age at which chair-
men step down. However, this is only partly 
accurate. The rise in retirement age emerged 
only after 2000, when it was a little over 68, 
increasing to around 70 in 2012.1 
1 The sudden but consistent drop after 2012 can be disregarded. It is an artefact of right-censored data which implies that chairmen 
are still in position, systematically reducing the average. 
Tenure
A rising recruitment age, coupled with the age 
at which chairmen leave the post rising more 
slowly, makes it inevitable that the average 
length of tenure will fall. Tenure was fairly 
stable until 2007–2008, after which the average 
declined from roughly 5.5 to 4.5 years. The de-
creasing tenure of supervisory board chairmen 
indicates a readiness to conform to the Dutch 
Corporate Governance Code, under which su-
pervisory board members may hold two terms 








Figure 1: Chairman age
Average years










Figure 2: Chairman tenure
Average years
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Executive backgrounds
Turning to the professional backgrounds of the 
184 individuals in our study, 62 (34%) of them 
had previously served as an executive board 
member or chief financial officer. However, the 
majority — 104 of the total group (57%) — had 
been chief executive officers prior to becoming 
chairman (see figure 3). 
We also looked more closely at the prevalence 
of CEO experience in the 50 companies we re-
viewed (see figure 4). In the early 1990s, 45% of 
supervisory board chairmen had hands- on CEO 
experience, increasing to 67% in 2002–2003. 
The figure then declined gradually, stabilising 
at 45%. In the same period, we see that the per-
centage of former CEOs in the total population 
has been shrinking.
We also examined where chairmen were most 
likely to have served at the executive level.  
Traditionally, the larger organisations are seen as 
offering an excellent grounding for future chair-
manships. And indeed, Philips, Shell, Unilever, 
and ABN AMRO are the main “suppliers” to the 
role (see figure 5. Excluded from this table are 
five chairmen who had a background in politics). 
Figure 5: Previous experience
Most common organisations where chairmen spent  
their executive careers
Company # Company #
Philips 13 SHV 5
Shell 12 DSM 4
Unilever 9 Aegon 3
ABN AMRO 8 Fortis 3
Various law firms 7 Heineken 3
AkzoNobel 6 Rabobank 3










Figure 4: Percentage of chairmen with 
CEO experience










Figure 3: Former positions held by chairmen





The vast majority of the group we reviewed are 
Dutch nationals (157 out of 184, or 85%). The 
rest are French (five), British (five), German 
(four), American (three), Belgian (two), and 
Swedish (two). The remaining six are from a 
variety of countries or hold dual nationalities 
(see figures 6 & 7).
The number of Dutch chairmen was stable at 
the near- 100% level until around 2003, after 
which the number of non- Dutch chairmen 
quickly increased, culminating in 2007 at 25% 
(see figure 8). This coincided with the takeover 
of ABN AMRO by a consortium of RBS, Fortis, 
and Banco Santander.
This trend then went into reverse almost  
immediately, with the proportion of Dutch 
chairmen in the 245 positions in the total group 
climbing back up to around 85% by 2018.
Gender
2 of 184
Number of female chairmen since 1990 
Even taking into account the lingering effects 
of the recruitment policies of the 1980s, the 
percentage of women in the overall population 
of chairmen is extremely low. The cohort of 184 
counts just two women among its ranks, or 
1.1%. Although the number of women in super-








Figure 6: Chairman nationality
Dutch vs. non-Dutch
Figure 7: Chairman nationality
Non-Dutch chairmen: country of origin
Country # Country #
France 5 Belgium 2
UK 5 Sweden 2
Germany 4 Other 6
USA 3
Figure 8: Chairman nationality
Chairmen of Dutch nationality, 1990–2018
▪ Chairmen with Dutch 
nationality (85%)
▪ Chairmen with non-
Dutch nationality 
(15%)
The chairman of The supervisory board in The neTherlands
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Education
Our research also looked at where the 184 in-
dividual chairmen studied (see figures 10 & 11). 
Of the Dutch universities, Erasmus University 
Rotterdam accounts for the greatest number 
of chairmen (40), followed by Delft University 
of Technology (22). The subgroup of chairmen 
with no formal high er education is concentrat-
ed in the early part of the research period.
Chairmen with a non- Dutch higher education (33) 
form another substantial group, partly reflecting 
foreign nationalities or qualifications such as 
MBAs undertaken overseas. 
As far as areas of study are concerned, 65 (35% 
of the 184 under review) had a background in 
business administration/economics, followed 
by 43 in engineering (22%) and 27 in law (14%), 
see figure 9. 
Figure 10: Higher education
By category
Education #
Dutch higher education 130 (70.7%)
Non- Dutch higher education 33 (17.9%)
No higher education 11 (6.0%)
NIVRA (or similar statutory  
accounting body)
6 (3.3%)
Higher vocational education level 4 (2.2%)
Figure 11: Higher education
Dutch universities from which chairmen graduated
University #
Erasmus University Rotterdam 40 (30.8%)
Delft University of Technology 22 (16.9%)
University of Leiden 15 (11.5%)
University of Amsterdam 15 (11.5%)
Eindhoven University of Technology 9 (6.9%)
Tilburg University 7 (5.4%)
Vrije Universiteit 6 (4.6%)
University of Groningen 5 (3.8%)
Nyenrode Business University 3 (2.3%)
Utrecht University 3 (2.3%)
Wageningen University and Research 3 (2.3%)
Radboud University 1 (0.8%)
University of Twente 1 (0.8%)









Figure 9: Educational background of chairmen





The vast majority — 147 of the 184 individ-
uals we reviewed — have occupied a single 
chairmanship, representing almost 80%. The 
number of individuals who have held two or 
more positions, simultaneously or sequentially, 
has declined in the review period. Even so, the 
number of those in this category (37) is not 
insubstantial. 26 chairman during the period 
held two chairmanships, and one chairman held 
a total of five positions over the review period. 
Limits imposed by the Dutch Corporate Govern-
ance Code, alongside the professionalisation of 
the role, have also accelerated the decline.
conclusIon 
 » The average age of chairmen has  
increased by more than four years to  
an average of 66.5 years.
 » More than half of the chairmen have CEO 
experience (57%) or held other executive 
level positions (28%). However, these 
numbers are slowly declining.
 » Philips, Shell, Unilever, and ABN AMRO 
have been important training grounds for 
chairmen of supervisory boards.
 » The vast majority of chairmen are Dutch 
nationals. Levels of other nationalities 
rose quickly after 2003, but the trend 
reversed around 2008. 
 » The percentage of women holding chair-
manships is extremely low.
 » The Erasmus University Rotterdam and 
Delft University of Technology produce 
the most chairmen. A substantial group 
of chairmen had a foreign education; 
these were either non- Dutch nationals or 
Dutch nationals who studied domestical-
ly and then abroad.
 » The largest group of chairmen had a busi-
ness administration/economics educa-
tional background.
 » 80% of the group held only one chair-
manship. The remaining 20% held two or 
more, simultaneously or sequentially, in 
the period between 1990–2018.
The chairman of The supervisory board in The neTherlands
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The changing role of the supervisory 
board chairman of Dutch listed 
companies: the next five years 
IntroductIon 
The growing imperatives of corporate govern-
ance have increased the importance of the 
supervisory board chairman in Dutch listed 
companies. Consequently, the profiles of those 
appointed to — and considered for — chair-
manships have changed. How this role evolves 
will define the quality of corporate governance 
and govern the selection criteria for candidates.
It makes sense then to explore what the role 
of the chairman might look like in the next five 
years — and what kind of candidate might 
occupy it. 
Methodology 
We invited 30 chairmen of Dutch listed com-
panies to contribute to our research into how 
their role might evolve over the next five years. 
Twenty- one of these chairmen agreed to partic-
ipate (see Appendix). We asked them to com-
plete a semi- structured questionnaire and in-
vited their personal reflections. We interviewed 
five of the 21 individually, to provide a deep dive 
into how they saw the chairman’s role chang-
ing. We focused here on six areas: (i) time 
commitment to and importance of the role, (ii) 
responsibilities, (iii) internal board processes, 
(iv) relations with external parties, ( v) recruit-
ment and on- boarding, and (vi) compensation.
results
Time commitment and importance of  
the chairman role
On average, participating chairmen commit an 
estimated 63 days per year. They predict that 
total time will increase by a substantial 22%, to 
an average of 77 days. 
All but one chairmen believe the importance of 
the position will grow over the next five years 
(see below). This rising influence will acceler-
ate the number of days that the role demands. 
More than 75% of the chairmen also partly or 
fully agree that cooperation between the CEO 
and the chairmen will intensify. A few chair-
















Figure 12: The chairman’s role
How chairmen view the importance of their role over 




way, suggest that differences in responsibility 
between chairman and CEO should be clear-
ly demarcated. Chairmen should also guard 
against other supervisory board members feel-
ing sidelined by closer CEO- chairman relations. 
Only a handful of companies in the Netherlands 
have a single-tier board and each of these is 
dual-listed. Since the option became available 
to all companies, only very few have chosen 
to adopt a single-tier board and none in our 
company sample. However, two-tier boards are 
moving informally in the direction of “one-and-
a-half-“ tier boards. As chairmen strengthen 
their position within internal corporate govern-
ance systems, our respondents expect this trend 
towards unitary boards will continue.
Chairmen were asked whether they expected to 
spend additional time on 11 areas of responsbil-
ity. As a group, they anticipate spending more 
time on all 11. Figure 13 ranks these areas in 
order of predicted demands on their time. 
Figure 13: Demands on chairmen’s time
Areas/activities that chairman believe will take more  
of their time over the next five years (by rank)
1. ICT/digital 
2. Strategy development and advice
3. Executive and non- executive recruitment 




8. Supervisory board group dynamics
9. Contacts with other stakeholders
10. Compliance issues
11. Financial reporting and control/finance 
Changing responsibilities 
A vast majority of respondents believe that in-
volvement in strategy development will contin-
ue to increase the next five years (see figure 14). 
However, their comments also suggest that this 
change is part of an existing long- term trend. 
In the wake of the Dutch Corporate Governance 
Code 2016, effective 1 January 2018, which rec-
ommends that supervisory boards should work 
with management to create the desired culture, 
the chairmen were also asked if they think that 
the importance of long- term planning in stra-
tegic decision- making will change. Almost half 
of the respondents think it will remain stable 
(47.6%); others see a slight increase (28.6%) or 
a strong increase (23.8%).
Individual comments give a more nuanced 
picture. Two specifically mention the Dutch 
Corporate Governance Code as a driving force. 
However, some see long- term orientation  
as integral to strategy, whereas others view  

















The supervisory board will be increasingly involved in 
strategy development over the next five years
The chairman of The supervisory board in The neTherlands
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We also asked the participating chairmen to 
consider this statement: “In the next five years, 
the chairman of the supervisory board has to 
deepen his knowledge of the non- financial per-
formance of the company (such as greenhouse 
gas emissions, employee satisfaction, and 
sustainability issues).” Only a few chairman 
disagree entirely. Individual comments show 
that the importance of these topics is growing, 
under pressure from sources ranging from 
governments, NGOs, the media and society to 
“green investors” and the governance depart-
ments of institutional investors. 
Finally, we asked the chairmen if they expect 
legal and other compliance responsibilities to 
occupy more of their attention. Although they 
do not anticipate committing more time to 
these areas, they do not expect to relax their 
attention, given the robust nature of compli-
ance demands. Thirteen of the 21 respondents 
(almost 62 %) partly or completely agree, only 
one completely disagrees, and the others  
are neutral. 
Internal board processes
Chairmen are responsible for the internal 
processes and dynamics within the supervisory 
board; they are also the supervisory board’s 
main point of contact with key players inside 
and outside the company. We asked participat-
ing chairmen if they envisioned strengthening 
contacts with management tiers below the ex-
ecutive board. Seventeen of the 21 respondents 
expect to do so, to a greater or lesser extent. 
The remainder foresee no change in levels  
of contact. 
Chairmen’s comments suggest that increased 
contact with this tier of executives has been 
under way for some time. It deepens a chair-
man’s understanding of what is going on in the 
company and is valuable in terms of succession 
planning. Respondents emphasise that such 
contact should be coordinated carefully with 
the CEO. 
The growing importance of separate commit-
tees within a supervisory board will change 
board dynamics. Most of the respondents 
(12) do not predict that this will increase the 
complexity of the chairman’s task; five see it as 
slightly reducing complexity, and four as only 
slightly complicated. It was noted that the com-
mittee system is effective, but that the chair-
man needs to guard against the development 
of sub groups. 
A slight majority predicts that the size of super-
visory boards will remain stable. Respondents 
agreed that the ideal supervisory board size is 
six to eight individuals. A far larger majority — 
with only one chairman disagreeing — believes 






The 2018 Corporate Governance Code pays 
close attention to the responsibilities of the 
supervisory board with regard to the role of 
culture in a company. We asked our respond-
ents about how the external world views the 
influence that superviso ry board chairman 
have on organisa tional culture. Opinions vary, 
but the majority (15, or 71.4%) thinks people 
overesti mate their influence (see figure 15). 
Some chairmen suggest that cultural change 
is an executive responsibil ity, not that of the 
supervisory board.
External relations 
We also asked participating supervisory board 
chairmen if they believed that in the next five 
years the wishes of the shareholders will occupy 
more of their attention. Fourteen slightly agreed 
(66.7%), and five completely agreed (23.8%). 
Only two were neutral. The CEO is the main link 
to shareholders, but it was noted that increas-
ingly they seek direct contact with the chairman. 
Recruitment of supervisory board 
members
The prevailing outlook for recruiting new mem-
bers to the supervisory board is an issue that 
worries many chairmen. Ten (almost 48%) fully 
agree and seven slightly agree that recruitment 
will become “increasingly difficult over the next 
five years”. No one disagreed; four (19%) were 
neutral (see figure 16). 
Chairmen noted that the quality of characteris-
tics that supervisory boards seek in a candidate 
is rising. And as supervisory board size is not 
expected to grow, there is an increasing need 
for “five- legged sheep” — exceptional people 
who bring multiple skills and experiences to the 
supervisory board. One respondent laments 
how hard it is to find “modern seniors and 
experienced juniors”.
Other factors raised by our group of chairmen 
include diversity requirements, external pres-
sure (from institutional investors, government 



















Figure 15: Can the chairman influence 
corporate culture?















Figure 16: Recruiting supervisory board 
members
Hiring suitable members will become increasingly  
difficult over the next five years
spencer sTuarT
a growing time commitment, and competition 
for specific expertise (such as ICT/digital). Also 
coming into play are corporate governance 
demands that limit board tenure to eight years 
and restrict the number of supervisory board 
positions that any one person can hold (see the 
Wet Bestuur en Toezicht). 
We also asked the chairmen to identify the key 
elements of a solid induction period for their 
successors. They unanimously favour intensive, 
meticulously planned onboarding programmes. 
A recurring suggestion is that new chairmen 
should not take over the position immediately 
upon appointment; rather, an incoming chair-
man should join the supervisory board for a 
year before assuming control. 
Compensation levels
The compensation levels of top executives have 
long been subject to intense scrutiny. Levels for 
supervisory board members have received far 
less attention. Whereas the supervisory board 
can determine the CEO’s compensation, no 
one can determine the compensation of the 
supervisory board — and what is a reasonable 
level — except the supervisory board itself. 
To complicate matters further, no clear stand-
ards exist to clarify what constitutes “reasona-
ble” compensation (except for the semi- public 
sector, where it is defined in the Wet Normering 
Topinkomens).
We asked our panel for their perceptions of the 
current compensation level among the general 
population of chairmen. Most (15, or 71.4%) 
think it is low or much too low. However, five 
believe it is the right level (23.8%), and one 
thinks it is far too high (see figure 17). 
The “Market” for 
supervIsory board 
MeMbers
The chairmen who took part in our forum 
highlighted an evident tightening in the 
“market” for supervisory board members.
Board professionalisation boosts the demands 
of the work and the time needed to do it. The 
number of qualified individuals willing to take 
on a large number of supervisory board 
memberships is small and declining. This 
shrinks the pool of suitable candidates.
However, an opposing trend exists: the drive 
for greater board diversity and the need for new 
expertise will broaden the domestic and 
international candidate base. This fresh layer 
comes into play as supervisory board members 
quit after the mandatory eight years — 
assuming they do not seek fresh supervisory 
board positions elsewhere — or when age 
limitations come into force.
The Spencer Stuart Board Practice has observed 
a growing structural shortage of candidates with 
experience in large Dutch listed companies. In 
the past 25 years, there has been an exodus of 
Dutch large- and medium- sized companies 
from the AEX- AMX indices. More than 50 larger 
companies that would have served as solid 
training grounds have left the stock exchange; 
only circa 20 large- or medium- sized companies 
have entered due to an IPO or autonomous 
growth (see Appendix). 
This contraction in training grounds diminishes 
the pool from which search firms can recruit. 
This is especially problematic for the position 
of the chairman of the supervisory board — for 
a healthily functioning supervisory board, it is 
vital that the chairman brings experience in at 




Some respondents remarked on the higher 
compensation of chairmen in some European 
countries (Switzerland, UK, France and Bel-
gium, for example), and that in the financial 
services and “semi-public” sectors, the com-
pensation does not reflect the risks involved. 
The Dutch Corporate Governance Code currently 
recommends not awarding shares or options 
to supervisory board members. We asked our 
participating supervisory board chairmen if they 
thought it should be possible to receive com-
pensation in this way. The response was mixed. 
Twelve of the 20 respondents agreed they would 
partly or fully welcome this possibility. However, 
eight disagree or are neutral (see figure 18). 
One chairman believes that the UK system 
in which chairmen are required to buy shares 
would not be a good fit with Dutch culture, 
warning that supervisory boards should not 
become obsessed with share prices. 
The group of chairmen was also asked to sug-
gest compensation criteria. Most of them advo-
cated company-related characteristics, similar 
to job evaluation criteria used to compensate 
CEOs: company size and complexity, technol-
ogy, risk and damage potential, responsibility, 
and time commitment. Two of the chairmen 
proposed that compensation should be linked 
to that of the CEO. One suggestion was to view 
compensation as a supply-demand process, 
perhaps taking the expertise of the candidate 
into account. Another chairman suggested 
basing fees on the hourly rates of boardroom 
consultants (“same level of oversight and 
advice role”). One chairman suggested taking 
the European median of similar companies as 
a benchmark (“just below the median”, to be 
precise), while another recommended bench-
marking only within the Netherlands rather 
than looking at other countries. In this scenario, 
non-Dutch candidates could receive a higher 
compensation level based on the country from 



























Figure 17: Chairman compensation 
How chairmen view the current level of compensation 
for supervisory board chairmen
Figure 18: Paying chairmen in shares/
options
Chairmen express their views on whether this should  
be possible
The chairman of The supervisory board in The neTherlands
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conclusIon
 » The chairman’s role will demand a greater 
time commitment. It is expected to grow 
from 63 days to 77 days, which is 22% 
more than it is now.
 » The relation between the chairmen and 
the CEO will further intensify.
 » The topics that will increase most in terms 
of time commitment are (a) ICT/digital, 
(b) strategy development and advice, and 
(c) recruitment of (non- ) executives.
 » Chairmen will need to pay more attention 
to non- financial performance measures 
(such as GHG emissions, employee satis-
faction, and sustainability issues).
 » Compliance will continue to require atten-
tion, but will not occupy much more of 
the chairman’s time.
 » Contacts with the management tiers  
below the executive board will require 
more attention.
 » The wishes of the shareholder will  
require more and more attention of  
the chairman.
 » Recruitment will be an important part of 
the chairman’s agenda.
 » The induction period of a new chairman is 
taken very seriously and needs meticulous 
planning; a one- year supervisory board 
membership is favoured before taking 
over the position of the chair.
 » Compensation of the chairman remains a 
complicated issue. Present compensation 
levels are overall seen as being on the  
low side. 
 » There is substantial interest in compen-
sating chairmen with shares/options.
 » The suggested criteria on which to base 
compensation levels match CEO job eval-
uation criteria, such as company size, 
complexity, reputational risk (etc). It is 
also suggested that compensation should 




chairmen of dutch listed companies: compensation
Research by the Spencer Stuart Board Practice shows 
that the base compensation for supervisory board 
chairmen at the 46 AEX and AMX companies with a 
two- tier board regime varies between €38,000 and 
€220,000 (with an average of €80,000).
There is substantial divergence between these 
companies, depending on size (revenue/employees), 
complexity and international remit. Compensation  
for the supervisory board chairman of the four 
companies with a single- tier board varies from 
€600,000 to €850,000. One of the companies 
(AirFrance- KLM) has a combined chairman/CEO  
role and is not included. 
Compensation of supervisory board members at the 
remaining 46 two- tier companies varies from €30,000 
to €90,000; the average is €52,000. A supervisory 
board chairman in the two- tier population earns 
around 1.54 times the base compensation of a 
supervisory board member, about 13.4% of the  
base compensation of a CEO.
Remuneration of supervisory boards of Dutch AEX- AMX companies in 2017 
Relative remuneration of supervisory board chairmen, board members and the CEO
The four companies with a single- tier board are: AirFrance- KLM, RELX Group, Shell, and Unilever. 
Source: Netherlands Board Index 2018
1 Excluding AirFrance-KLM which has combined chairman/CEO role




















46 94,000 80,000 38,000 220,000 67,000 52,000 30,000 90,000
Companies with  
one-tier boards
4 763,0001 722,000 600,000 850,000 112,000 89,000 40,000 135,000
Chairman vs non-executive  
director compensation (%)
Chairman vs  
CEO compensation (%)
# Base Total Base
Companies with 
two-tier boards
46 154% 140% 11.4%
Companies with  
one-tier boards
4 811% 681% 55%
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Appendix 
Companies that have disappeared from the AEX- AMX due to mergers and 
acquisitions or bankruptcy over the period researched
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